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DESIGNING AND EXECUTING
A "FAIR" REVLON AUCTION
I. Introduction
The takeover of RJR Nabisco, Inc. (RJR), was the largest lever-
aged buyout' in history.2 RJR's shareholders reaped a tremendous in-
vestment profit when the company's stock surged more than thirty-
five points by the time the sale of RJR was completed.3 The sale of
RJR was achieved through an auction4 of the company by the outside
directors5 in reaction to the surprise offer by RJR's management to
take the firm private for $75 per share in a management leveraged
buyout.6 The auction consisted of three bidders: RJR's management,
a group from First Boston Corporation, and the leveraged buyout
firm of Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (KKR). KKR eventually won
the auction with a bid of $109 per share to be paid in cash and
securities.'
1. In a leveraged buyout, a group of buyers purchase a controlling interest in a cor-
poration through the use of borrowed capital. The purchasing group puts up a small
amount of money and uses the company's assets as collateral for loans to finance the
purchase of the target firm's stock. If the target firm is purchased, it's cash flow will then
be used to pay off the debt. A. PESSIN & J. Ross, MORE WORDS OF WALL STREET 155
(1986) [hereinafter PESSIN & Ross].
2. See Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at Al0, col. 3. On Wednesday, November 30, 1988
the RJR Board of Directors approved the record 25.07 billion dollar bid for the company
by Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (KKR). Id.
3. See Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at Cl, col. 4. RJR common stock climbed from a
pre-auction price of approximately $55 per share during mid-October 1988 to $94.5 per
share on Thursday, December 1, 1988, the day after the takeover was approved by RJR's
board. Id. Thus, in less than six weeks, RJR's common stock increased more than 70%.
Id.
4. "An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining re-
source allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants." See Mc-
Afee & McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699, 701 (1987) [hereinafter
McAfee & McMillan].
5. An outside director is defined as a "[n]on-employee director with no or minimal
direct interest in [the] corporation." An inside director is a "[d]irector who is an em-
ployee, officer or major stockholder of [the] corporation, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 414
(5th ed. 1979).
6. Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988 at Al, col. 6. The auction was initiated after former RJR
President F. Ross Johnson initiated a bid for the company on Oct. 20, 1988 for $75 a
share. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,703 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
7. See, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at AI0, col. 3. KKR offered shareholders $81 per
share in cash, $18 per share in exchangeable preferred stock, and $10 per share in deben-
tures convertible into approximately 25% of the acquiring company's equity, for a total
of $109 per share. Id. The market value, however, for RJR's common stock after the
takeover was in the low to mid-$90 range, leaving about a $16 to $19 gap between the
offering value and the market value. See Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988 at Cl, col. 4. The gap
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While the RJR shareholders reaped a substantial premium for their
shares, the auction may not have produced the maximum price for the
shareholders.' Henry Kravis of KKR believed that the RJR board of
directors would not stay committed to their single-round, first-price
sealed-bid auction process. Therefore, Kravis did not initially submit
his best bid because he correctly anticipated that there would be addi-
tional rounds of bidding where he would have the opportunity to in-
crease KKR's bid.9 Based on Kravis' strategy, it is uncertain whether
the winning bid was the highest bid that KKR would have offered, or
whether KKR might have bid higher if the auction either had con-
tained a third round of bidding or had been otherwise structured
differently.
In the past, courts have considered the proper role of a corpora-
tion's board of directors in response to a takeover threat.'0 Numerous
courts have considered protests against auction procedures. In doing
so, the courts have had to balance unfair auction attempts against the
sanctity of the business judgment rule.I' The Delaware Supreme
occurred because KKR planned to pay only $81 a share in cash, and $28 a share in
preferred stock and convertible debentures. Id. The value of the preferred stock and con-
vertible debentures are often substantially discounted by the market. Id.
8. See generally Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at All, col. 2.
9. Id. Mr. Kravis' strategy was based upon his belief that KKR would be able to
increase its bid or that additional rounds of bidding would be held.
10. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958-59 (Del. 1985);
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
11. See Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at AI0, col. 3. See generally In re Fort Howard
Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991 (Del. Ch., Aug. 8, 1988) (WESTLAW, DE-CS
Database) (refusal of the board of directors to furnish one bidder with information about
the company's value on the same terms as the management team bidder protected by the
business judgement rule); Cottle v. Storer Communications Inc., 849 F.2d 570 (11 th Cir.
1988) (board of directors' decision to favor one bidder by granting asset lock-up agree-
ment, accepting favored bidder's bid without resuming negotiations with competing bid-
der and granting $18,000,000 termination fee protected by the business judgment rule);
CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (board of
directors' determination that the auction was still in progress without the bidding party
seeking the preliminary injunction stating that it has made its final and highest bid pro-
tected by business judgment rule); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d
770 (Del. Ch. 1988) (business judgment rule protected the directors' favoring one bidder
by granting him a topping and a termination fee which caused competing bidder to with-
draw from auction); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,660, at 98,030 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, revised Feb. 8 1988) (question
of what specific methods target company board of directors may use to elicit bids from
potential acquires will normally be a matter of the director's judgment that must neces-
sarily vary in each case.); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1986)
(board of directors, which used corporate funds to assist management in effectuating
leveraged buyout by rejecting higher competing bid on the same terms, did not act in
good faith to obtain best price for shareholders).
DESIGNING REVLON AUCTIONS
Court in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan 12 held that directors can
design and conduct any type of auction as long as they observe the
requirement of fairness for the purpose of obtaining the highest price
for the shareholders. A general understanding of auction theory will
aid courts in scrutinizing the actions of directors in executing auctions
of companies. In addition, auction theory will aid directors in under-
standing how to design and execute corporate auctions and how best
to respond to differing bids in order to maximize shareholder profit.
Part II of this Note presents a historical background of relevant
Delaware case law regarding the obligations of directors in takeovers
and control transactions. Part III explores the fundamentals of auc-
tion theory and the different types of auctions. Part IV examines the
concept of the optimal auction and proposes various techniques that a
board of directors can use to design an optimal auction for corporate
control. Part V concludes that, by using auction theory to design and
conduct an auction, and by committing to an auction process, direc-
tors will satisfy their duty to conduct a fair auction for the benefit of
the shareholders.
II. Historical Development Of Directors' Obligations
In Takeovers And Control Transactions
Under Delaware Case Law
Over the past decade, Delaware case law has outlined the fiduciary
duties owed by a corporations' board of directors during takeovers
and control transactions. The historical development of these fiduci-
ary duties has influenced the application of the business judgment
rule's protection of the directors' decisions pertaining to the design
and execution of an auction for the sale of a company.
A. The Business Judgment Rule And The Enhanced Fiduciary
Duties Of Directors In Takeover And Control
Transactions Required Under Unocal v. Mesa
Petroleum Corp.
1. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a judicial standard which is used to
analyze and review corporate decision making.' 3 Stated generally, the
business judgment rule protects directors from liability for decisions
12. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,401, at 92,583 (Del. May
3, 1989).
13. Note, Corporate Auctions and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation of
the Business Judgment Rule, 87 MICH. L. REV. 276, 280 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Corpo-
rate Auctions).
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"made in good faith and in the exercise of due care." 14 The business
judgment rule presumes "that in making a business decision the direc-
tors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the
company."'I5 Under the business judgment rule, a court will not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the board of directors if the board's
judgment can be "attributed to any rational purpose."16
In Pogostin v. Rice'7 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
business judgment rule is applicable in takeover and control transac-
tions.' 8 Under Delaware law, actions taken by the board in response
to takeover threats are protected by the business judgment rule only
when the directors are disinterested and independent. '
14. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988).
15. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex
Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) and Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp.,
126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924)). Directors are presumed to make their business decisions
with due care (on an informed basis and after a reasonable investigation) and in good
faith (in the honest belief that they were acting in the best interest of the corporation). See
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. These presumptions are substantiated
when the majority of the board favoring the proposal consists of outside directors. Uno-
cal, 493 A.2d at 955; Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985);
Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988).
16. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971)). The reasoning behind the business judgment rule is based on a judicial pol-
icy of practical deference:
[b]ecause business men and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills,
information and judgement not possessed by reviewing courts and because there
is great social utility in encouraging the allocation of assets and the evaluation
and assumption of economic risk by those with such skill and information,
courts have long been reluctant to second-guess such decisions when they ap-
pear to have been made in good faith.
J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d at 781 (citing Solash v. Telex Corp.,
[1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,608, at 97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19,
1988)). See also Note, Corporate Auctions, supra note 13, at 281.
17. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
18. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (citing
Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 627).
19. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Only disinterested directors whose conduct meets
the test of business judgment can claim protection under the business judgment rule. Id.
From a conflict of interest standpoint, directors "can neither appear on both sides of the
transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from a sense of self-dealing,
as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally.
Id. (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien 280 A.2d 717, 720 (1971); Cheff v. Dunhill Int'l
Inc., 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); David J. Green & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249
A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968)).
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2. The Enhanced Fiduciary Duties Of Directors In' Takeover and
Control Transactions Required Under Unocal v. Mesa
Petroleum Corporation
The leading case governing the fiduciary duties of directors arising
from the business judgment rule applied to takeover and control
transactions is Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Corp.20 In Unocal the tar-
get's board of directors determined that a two-tier "front loaded"
cash tender offer by Mesa Petroleum Co. (Mesa) for approximately
37% of the company's outstanding stock at $54 per share was both
"coercive and inadequate.2' In order to defeat the inadequate tender
offer, the board commenced a self-tender offer by the corporation for
its own shares which excluded only Mesa from participation.22 In
Unocal the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the board's actions, find-
ing that they were taken in good faith, with due care and on an in-
formed basis.23 The Unocal court held that the board of directors'
power to act on behalf of the corporation is derived from its funda-
mental duty to protect the corporate entity, which includes the share-
holders, from a threat that the board reasonably perceives may be
harmful.24
The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal recognized that in contests
for corporate control, the directors are faced with an inherent conflict
of interest: they desire both to earn profit for the shareholders and to
retain their control of the corporation. The Unocal court, therefore,
20. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Unocal is the leading case both in and outside of Dela-
ware since many states look to Delaware for guidance on issues of corporate fiduciary
duty. Note, Corporate Auctions, supra note 13, at 282 n.31 (citing Dynamics Corp. of Am.
v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69
(1987)).
21. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. The "back-end" of the tender offer would exchange
the remaining publicly held shares by an exchange of securities which the offeror claimed
to be worth $54 per share. Id. However, in reality these securities are "junk bonds" be-
cause they would be highly subordinated and Unocal's capitalization would become
highly leveraged after the takeover. Id. at 949-50.
22. Id. at 950-51.
23. Id. at 958-59.
24. Id. at 954.
25. Id. The Unocal court noted that when issues of corporate control are at stake
there exists "the omnipresent specter that a board [of directors] may be acting primarily
in its own interests rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders." Id. The
target's board of directors may attempt to entrench themselves in order to retain their
employment, prestige and power in the corporation. Outside directors may lose their
salaried positions. See Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, Inc., 686 F.
Supp. 595, 601 (S.D. Tex. 1988). Inside directors may lose their employment, prestige
and power. Id. See also Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corpo-
rate Web, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS 82 (1988). Shareholders and managers have
several potential areas of conflict such as compensation, dividends, and self-dealing trans-
actions. Id. In a takeover situation, the conflicts are heightened because shareholders are
1989]
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imposed on directors "an enhanced duty which calls for judicial ex-
amination at the threshold before the protections of the business judg-
ment rule may be conferred. '2 6
In Unocal the Delaware Supreme Court developed a two-pronged
test to evaluate directors' decisions in takeover contests." In the first
prong of the Unocal test, the board of directors has the burden of
showing that they had reason to believe "a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock owner-
ship."'2  In the second prong of the Unocal test, the directors have the
burden of demonstrating that the defensive measure is "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed."2 9 Under Unocal a court will defer to the
business judgment of the board "unless it is shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the directors' decisions were primarily based
on perpetuating themselves in office, or on some other breach of fidu-
ciary duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being
uninformed."3
interested in maximizing their wealth while management has an interest in maintaining
its position within the company. Id. at 85. This conflict of interest can be explained by
examining the central problem of risk in the context of the portfolio theory. Id. at 82-85.
The modern portfolio theory states that an investor can lower his overall risk and still
achieve the same desired return by making several investments each with various degrees
of risk, and different expected rates of return. Id. An investor using this approach should
be largely immune to firm-specific risk. Id. Less risk averse shareholders invest their
money in a company with the goal of maximizing the return on their investment. Id. at
84. In any investment (except those that have pure arbitrage opportunities), the investor
accepts a certain level of risk in losing both his capital and an opportunity to invest his
capital elsewhere in exchange for a desired financial return. Id. Similarly, portfolio the-
ory can be used to analyze other types of investments such as an investment in human
capital. A manager's job is his most important asset. Id. at 82. Managers invest their own
human capital into a company in exchange for a monetary return that is paid off incre-
mentally in the form of compensation. Id. Management, however, is overinvested in the
firm for several reasons. Id. Unlike shareholders who can own many stocks, a manager is
unable to diversify the risk of his human capital investment since he can only have one
full-time career. Id. The manager is also overinvested in the firm because he is often
compensated in nontransferable stock options and other firm-specific fringe benefits. Id.
In addition, the reinvestment risk for human capital is much greater than the reinvest-
ment risk for monetary capital since the market for senior executive employment is much
smaller than the market for capital, and because managers may further produce and de-
velop firm-specific human capital. Id. Thus, a manager has an extremely strong incentive
to act in his own self interest and maintain his own position within a company because he
cannot spread his risk and is economically wedded to the firm. Id. at 82-3.
26. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
27. Id. at 955; Capital City Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787,
796 (Del. Ch. 1988).
28. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. This burden can be satisfied if the directors show that
they exercised due care and acted in good faith under the circumstances. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 958. Many courts have used Unocal's two-step analysis where they have
been asked to enjoin the adoption or administration of a poison pill defense during a
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B. The Sale Of The Corporation And The Auction, Requirement
Under Revlon
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. ,31 MacAn-
hostile takeover. See, e.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422,
440 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (use of the rights plan to fend off coercive offers and to promote
additional bidding held reasonable because the auction for Federated was still in pro-
gress); Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1298-300 (N.D. 11. 1988)
(court refused to enter preliminary injunction requiring the board of USG Corp. to re-
deem its rights plan, because the board correctly perceived Desert Partner's two-tier.
tender offer as being coercive, and the inadequate price of the offer threatened the com-
pany); Southdown Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.
Tex. 1988) (tender offeror granted preliminary injunction against target corporation's em-
ployment of a shareholder option plan and recapitalization: coercive all-cash tender offer
posed no threat to the Moore McCormack stockholders). The Southdown court addition-
ally noted that the defendant had been unable to solicit any competing bids and was not
using the rights plan to increase the value of the bid. Id. at 598. Thus, the court con-
cluded that "[i]t is time to allow the owners more freedom and less protection." Id. at
604. Facet Ent., Inc. v. The Prospect Group, Inc. No. 9746 (Del. Ch., Apr. 15, 1988)
(WESTLAW, DE-CS Database) (court held that even though The Prospect Group of-
fered an all cash offer for 100% of Facet's shares, retention of the rights plan was reason-
able since it may be used to prevent coercive offers and encourage higher bidding until the
target's board has completed an auction for the company); Doskocil Co., Inc. v. Griggy,
No. 10,095 (Del. Ch., Oct. 7, 1988) (WESTLAW, DE-CS Database) (court permitted
target board to keep the rights plan in place despite the fact that 86% of the company's
shares had already been tendered to a hostile offeror; court held that use of rights plan
was reasonable because it was still able to act as a mechanism to secure a higher offer
from a potential bidder who requested an additional week to review financial informa-
tion); Capital City Assoc. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790-91 (Del. Ch. 1988) (ordering
Interco's board to redeem the rights plan because its only purpose was to protect a board-
sponsored restructuring and to prevent the shareholders from considering an alternative
non-coercive tender offer). The Interco court found that the tender offer was very close in
value to the proposed restructuring and thus the threat of an inadequate bid was too mild
to keep the pill in place. Id. at 798. The court also noted that the target's directors had
enough time to arrange an alternative transaction and did not intend to institute an auc-
tion or negotiate for an increase in the pending offer. Id. See also Grand Metro. PLC v.
The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988) (ordering Pillsbury's Board to redeem
its poison pill, because the decision by the Pillsbury Board to retain the pill was not
reasonable to the threat posed since the rights plan served no purpose in this case other
than to preclude shareholders from having the opportunity of accepting Grand Metropol-
itan's offer); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer Inc., [1988-89 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,179, at 91,632 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988) (court refused to
grant a preliminary injunction that would set aside Prime Computer's flip-in/flip-out
shareholders' rights plan in light of the plaintiff's non-coercive tender offer). The Prime
Computer court held that the plaintiff had not borne the burden of demonstrating that the
directors of Prime Computer acted unreasonably. The court in Prime Computer noted
that the tender offer was pending for only a short time and that the poison pill had not
outlived its usefulness as Prime Computer was willing to consider further offers and was
studying available alternatives. Id. See also In re Holly Farm Corp. Shareholders Litig.,
[1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,181, at 91,641 (Del. Ch., Dec.
30, 1988) (refusing to order the Board of Holly Farm to redeem its poison pill, stating
that the poison pill still has a useful role in maximizing value, but cautioning that there
may come a time when the pill will no longer serve a valid purpose).
31. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The Revlon court held that a lock-up agreement that
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drews & Forbes Holding, Inc. which controlled the hostile bidder
Pantry Pride, sued the target Revlon Inc. in order to enjoin certain
defensive actions taken by the target's board of directors. 2 Revlon's
board of directors attempted to thwart an all-cash tender offer by
Pantry Pride by commencing its own self-tender offer to purchase
25% of its outstanding common stock in exchange for debt securi-
ties.33 The new notes contained covenants which would limit Revlon's
ability to sell assets, pay dividends, or incur additional debt unless
approval was given by the "independent" 34 directors on the board.35
Revlon's board later negotiated a merger with the leveraged buyout
firm of Fosterman Little & Co. (Fosterman) which would require the
board to waive the protective covenants in the notes.36 When the
merger, including the waiver of the covenants in the notes, was an-
nounced to the public, the market value of the notes fell substantially
and irate shareholders threatened to sue Revlon's board of directors.37
To escape litigation, the directors rearranged the merger agreement
with Fosterman agreeing to support the par value of the notes.3"
Although a bidding war commenced, Revlon's board accepted Fos-
terman's last offer even though Pantry Pride announced that it would
bid higher than any other bid offered.39
In Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court held that when the dissolu-
tion of a company appears inevitable, the board of directors must auc-
tion the company to the highest bidder in order to maximize the
shareholders' profit.' The Revlon court emphasized that "[m]arket
the board of directors entered into with one of the bidders constituted a breach of the
board's fiduciary duty where the agreement to negotiate with only one bidder ended the
auction. Id. at 184.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 177. The initial Pantry Pride offer was a cash tender offer for all Revlon
shares. Id. Pantry Pride would pay $47.50 per common share and $26.67 per preferred
share. Id. Pantry Pride's offer was subject to 1) obtaining financing for the purchase, and
2) redemption of the rights plan. Id.
34. Independent directors are defined as non-management directors. Id. at 177.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 178. The terms of the merger with Fosterman consisted of each stockholder
receiving $56 cash per share, management purchasing stock in the new company by exer-
cising their "golden parachutes," Fosterman assuming the $475 million debt incurred by
Revlon because of the issuance of the notes and Revlon's board redeeming the rights and
waving the protective covenants of the notes for Fosterman. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 178-79.
39. Id. at 178.
40. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. The issue of when the break-up of a company appears
inevitable, and when a Revlon auction begins is beyond the scope of this Note. See gener-
ally, Paramount Communications Inc., v. Time Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,264 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (affirming the lower court's
ruling which upheld the decision of Time Inc.'s Board of Directors to reject the hostile
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forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target's share-
holders the best price available for their equity."'"
The Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon held that once an auction
has begun, the duty of the board of directors changes from preserving
the corporate entity to maximizing the price that the stockholders will
receive from the sale of the company.42 The Revlon court stated that
in this situation, the responsibility of the board of directors under the
Unocal standard is significantly altered because the directors are "no
longer faced [with] threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to
the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. [Thus,]
[t]he whole question of corporate defensive measures [becomes]
moot."43 In a takeover situation, therefore, once a Revlon auction has
begun, the action of directors must be a reasonable response which
will maximize shareholder profits."
C. The Discretion of Directors In Designing And Conducting An
Auction For The Purpose Of Maximizing Shareholder
Wealth Under Mills Acquistion Co. v. Macmillan
In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,45 a bidding war erupted be-
tween KKR and Mills Acquisition Co. for the purchase of Macmillan
Inc. Originally, Macmillan's board of directors solicited bids from
several potential acquirors,46 but only KKR and Mills submitted bids
by the deadline. After KKR was announced as the winning bidder,
the controller of Mills, Robert Maxwell, increased his bid and filed
suit to render the auction void claiming that the auction process was
noncoercive tender offer by Paramount Communications Inc. in favor of pursuing a long
term value maximizing strategy by merging with Warner Communications Inc.).
41. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. The Revlon court noted that the role of directors re-
mains an active one and changes only in so far as that they have an additional duty of
selling the company at the highest price offered for the benefit of the shareholders. Id. at
184 n.16.
42. Id. at 182. The Revlon court noted that "[t]he directors' role changed from de-
fenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 185. The Revlon court held that by granting an asset option lock-up to a
white knight, the directors followed a course which ended the auction by allowing consid-
erations other than the maximization of shareholder profit to affect their judgement. Id.
45. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,401, at 92,583 (Del. May 3, 1989).
46. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,071, at 94,014 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 94,401, at 92,583 (Del. May 3,
1989). Initially, Macmillan, through its financial advisor, contacted or met with over 30
companies that had expressed an interest. Over the next several months, however, the
field of serious potential acquirors narrowed to six. Id.
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disguised to favor KKR.47 Maxwell claimed that by placing the entire
auction in the hands of Macmillan's chief executive officer who had a
personal interest in ensuring the success of KKR's bid, Macmillan's
board prevented the establishment of a truly fair and independent
auction.48
In Macmillan, the Delaware Supreme Court attempted to clarify
how directors should conduct a Revlon auction. Specifically, MacMil-
lan held that under Delaware law directors are not required to con-
duct an auction according to a standard formula,49 but rather are
required only to "observe the significant requirement of fairness for
the purpose enhancing general shareholder interests."5 The Macmil-
lan court stated that there is no intention of limiting the broad negoti-
ating powers of directors to secure the highest price available for the
stockholders.5 Instead, the Macmillan court stressed that directors
may use a variety of devices52 and offer or receive concessions that
favor one bidder over another in order to obtain the maximum price
for the stockholders, as long as is the board's paramount objective is
the interest of the stockholders. 53
The Macmillan court upheld the business judgment rule in order to
protect the directors' discretion in designing and executing an auc-
tion.5 4 The court held, however, that before the presumptions of the
business judgment rule will apply, the director's discretion must with-
47. See Mills Acquisition Co., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,071, at 94,014. Maxwell (head of the Mills bidding group) stated in a letter submit-
ted to Macmillan with MCC's bid, "[i]f you have a financed binding alternative proposal
which will generate a greater present value for you shareholders, I will withdraw my
bid." Id. When the Macmillan Board approved KKR's higher bid, MCC did not with-
draw its bid but instead responded by increasing its bid and initiating litigation. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 92,601. The Macmillan court noted that when conducting an auction, the
directors are not precluded from offering bidders differing treatment when necessary, in
order to advance shareholder interest.Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Macmillan court refused to limit the authority of directors to design and
execute their own auction in order to achieve the best price for the stockholders. Id.
52. Id. (citing In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Inc. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781-84
(Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 540 A.2d 1088 (Del. 1988)); see infra notes 136-79 and accom-
panying text.
53. Macmillan, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,401, at
92,601. The MacMillan court noted that differing treatment of bidders may be necessary
in situations where the board is confronted with coercive "two-tiered" tender offers. Id. at
92,601 n.38. However, when using tactics that favor one bidder, "the board's primary
objective and essential purpose, must remain the enhancement of the bidding process for
the benefit of the stockholders." Id.
54. Macmillan, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,9401 at
92,602.
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stand the enhanced Unocal standard of judicial scrutiny." The Mac-
millan court reaffirmed the holding in Revlon by holding that once an
auction has begun, the two part Unocal test is altered because the
duty of the board of directors changes from preserving the corporate
entity to auctioning the company for the benefit of the shareholders.56
The Macmillan court held that the plaintiff must first demonstrate
that the target's directors treated one or more of the bidders un-
equally before the Unocal two-part threshold requirement is
invoked."
. In the first prong of the original Unocal test, the directors had the
burden of showing that they had reason to believe "a danger to corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock
ownership.""8 Under the first prong of the altered test, the trial court
must examine whether the directors correctly perceived that through
their actions, the interests of shareholders were enhanced. 9 Alterna-
tively, directors must perceive that their objective of obtaining the
maximum price for shareholders would be threatened if they did not
pursue their proposed course of action. In the second prong of the
original Unocal test, the directors have the burden of demonstrating
that the defensive measure is "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed" to the corporate entity.60 Under the second prong of the al-
tered test, the directors' actions must be "reasonable in relation to the
advantage sought to be achieved or conversely, to the threat which a
particular bid allegedly poses to stockholder interests."'" Once both
prongs of the altered test are satisfied, the actions of directors in re-
sponse to bids will be protected by the business judgment rule.6 2
55. Id. at 92,602.
56. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,071, at 92,602 (citing Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d
173, 182 (Del. 1986)).
57. Id. In Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court held " '[flavoritism for a white knight
to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be justifiable when the latter's offer ad-
versely affects shareholder interests but . . . the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced
Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions.' " Id. (quoting Revlon,
506 A.2d at 182).
58. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). This burden
can be satisfied if the directors show that they exercised due care and acted in good faith
under the circumstances. Id.
59. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,401, at 92,602 (Del. May 3, 1989).
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). Under Macmillan, the degree of benefit or
detriment to the shareholders' interests, reflected by the amount or terms of the bids, will
determine the varying degree of latitude that directors may have in responding to differ-
ing bids. Id.
62. Id.
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In order to exercise their business judgment, directors should un-
derstand how to adequately respond to differing bids in order to maxi-
mize shareholder profit. Such an understanding can be derived from
auction theory which explains the design and execution of various
types of auctions as well as the panolopy of devices that can be used to
influence bidder behavior. A general understanding of auction theory
will not only help directors design and execute an optimal Revlon auc-
tion, but will also aid courts in scrutinizing the actions of directors
under the altered Revlon version of the two-pronged Unocal test.
III. Auction Theory
Auction theory provides a model for pricing that occurs between
buyers and sellers in the marketplace.63 An auction is a market insti-
tution with a set of explicit rules for allocating resources.' Auction
prices are based upon a bidding process among buyers and sellers.65
Typically, auctions are used in the place of other selling devices, such
as fixed prices, when the seller is uncertain as to the market's true
valuation of the item.66 Auctions account for an enormous amount of
economic activity in the United States and are currently used to sell a
wide variety of items such as livestock, artwork, books, securities,
timber rights, oil tracts, commodities, corporate assets, and con-
tracting services.".
A. The Importance Of A Seller's Commitment To The Auction
Process
A typical auction consists of a monopolist 68 seller and an oligop-
63. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 670.
64. Id. at 701.
65. Id. at 701; see also Harris & Raviv, Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of
Auctions, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1477 (1981). Many new securities are sold through some
type of auction process. For example, since 1964, France has used a sealed-bid auction to
sell all initial common stock issues. In the United States, auctions are used to sell United
States Treasury long and short term bonds as well as corporate bonds and commercial
paper. Id.
66. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 704.
67. See Milgram & Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982) [hereinafter Milgram & Weber]; see also McAfee & McMil-
lan, supra note 4, at 702. Auctions have been used to sell more novel items such as import
quotas, airline time and terminal slots, and have even been used as a mechanism to select
the location of hazardous waste disposal plants and prisons. See McAFee & McMillan,
supra note 4, at 702.
68. A monopolist is an individual who sells a unique item. See McAfee & McMillan,
supra note 4, at 703.
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sony6 9 of bidders.76 Auction theory presumes that the monopolist has
the advantage of designing and executing7' the auction and commit-
ting himself to a set of rules.72 Commitment of the auction organizer
to a binding set of auction procedures is crucial to the seller obtaining
the best price. 73 A committed seller can adopt procedures to induce
the bidders to put forward their highest offers.7 4 If the seller fails to
commit himself to an auction process, the bidders may not offer their
highest bid because they will not bid as hypothesized for a particular
type of auction. 7' This unpredictability will ultimately decrease the
seller's and shareholders' potential return.76
In the first-price sealed-bid auction, for example, a bidder is ex-
pected to submit one sealed bid that is below his own valuation of the
object but is slightly above what the bidder perceives will be the sec-
ond highest bid. If the bidders bid as hypothesized, it will be in the
seller's interest to use the bids to estimate the highest bidder's valua-
tion of the item, and then renege on his commitment to award the
object for the amount of the highest bid. The seller could later maxi-
mize the price he receives by offering the item at a price greater than
the highest bid but slightly less than the estimated highest valuation,
for it would still be in the interest of the highest bidder to accept the
seller's offer. 7 7 If, however, the bidders believe that the seller will re-
nege on his commitment to the first-price sealed-bid auction process,
they would submit lower bids that do not reflect their true valuation
69. An oligopsony refers to the small group of bidders who participate in the auction.
Id.
70. Although it is possible that many bidders who will participate in an auction and
"perfect" competition will prevail, usually when the item being auctioned is unique and
very expensive there will only be a few bidders. See id.
71. This is because the bidders know that the seller cannot change his auction process
after observing the bids, even if it would be in the seller's best interest to withdraw the
offer to sell. See McAFee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 703.
72. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
73. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
74. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 703. "If the buyer can accept an irrevo-
cable commitment, in a way that is unambiguously visible to the seller, he can squeeze the
range of indeterminacy down to the point most favorable to him." Id. at 703-04 (quoting
T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 24 (1960)). This principle follows from the
paradox that the ability to control an adversary may depend on the power to constrain
oneself. Id. at 704.
75. There are several different types of auctions, each of which functions differently.
Each auction type will cause a bidder to use a different bidding strategy in order to win
the auction at the lowest price possible. See infra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
76. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 703. In addition, the cost of reneging
on a current commitment may consist of the loss of future bargaining power or the loss of
credibility as to any commitments in the future. Id. at 704.
77. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 703.
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of the object.7 8 If the bidders submit bids for an object which do not
reflect their true valuation, the seller's attempt to gain a bargaining
advantage by designing and executing an auction will fail because he
is unable to obtain the highest price for the item. 9
B. Types of Auctions
Analytically, there are four basic types of auctions: (1) the English
auction; (2) the Dutch auction; (3) the first-price sealed-bid auction;
and (4) the second-price sealed-bid auction. 0 In the English auc-
tion,8' the bidding price is continuously increased until only one bid-
der is left.8 2 While there are several types of English auctions,83 the
essential feature of this type of auction is that every bidder is aware at
all times of the current highest bid and the number of active bidders.8 4
In contrast, the auctioneer in the Dutch auction8 5 initially calls a
high price. The price is then continuously lowered until one bidder
claims the item for that price and stops the auction. 6
In the first-price sealed-bid auction bidders submit sealed bids to
the seller.87 The bidder who submits the highest bid wins the object
and must pay the price equal to the amount of his bid.88 The bidder is
unable to observe his rival's bids, and may submit only one un-
revisable bid.8 9
78. Id.
79. Id. The original RJR auction was a first-price sealed-bid auction. However, be-
cause the bidders suspected that the seller would renege on his commitment to the auc-
tion process, they initially submitted low bids which did not reflect their true valuation of
RJR. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
80. See Milgram & Weber, supra note 67, at 1089-90.
81. The English auction is also called the open, oral ascending bid auction. See Mc-
Afee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 702.
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also Milgram & Weber, supra note 67, at 1104. There are several ways to
conduct an English auction. In some, an auctioneer calls the bids, while in others, bidders
call out their own bids. In the Japanese variant, the current price is posted electronically;
as the price rises continuously, bidders who wish to participate at a current price press a
button while bidders who wish to withdraw release the button. Id.
84. See Milgram & Weber, supra note 67, at 1090 n.6.
85. The Dutch auction is also called the descending bid auction. See McAfee & Mc-
Millan, supra note 4, at 702.
86. Id.; see also Milgram & Weber, supra note 67, at 1089. The Dutch auction has
been used to sell items ranging from flowers in the Netherlands to fish in Israel. See
McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 702.
87. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 702.
88. Id.; see also Milgram & Weber, supra note 67, at 1090 n.6.
89. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 702. First-price sealed-bid auctions are
used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to sell the assets of failed
banks. See James & Weir, An Analysis of FDIC Failed Bank Auctions, 20 J. OF MONE-
TARY ECON. 141, 142 (1987). The United States Government uses these auctions to sell
1989] DESIGNING RE VLON A UCTIONS
In the second-price sealed-bid auction, bidders submit one sealed
bid with the advanced knowledge that the highest bidder wins the
object but pays a price that is equal to the second highest bid.9" In
theory, bidders will place a bid that is very close to or even slightly
above their true valuation of the item, since they fully realize that
they will have to pay only an amount equal to the second highest
bid.91
Commentators have made several observations based on theoretical
comparisons of these four types of auctions. 92 First, regardless of
value correlations and the propensity of bidders to take risks, the first-
price sealed-bid auction is strategically equivalent to and yields the
same outcome as the Dutch auction.93 These two types of auctions are
functional equivalents because in each one, the bidder is faced with
the same situation-the bidder knows nothing about the decisions of
the other bidders, and thus must independently decide how high he
will bid. Furthermore, in both the first-price sealed-bid and the Dutch
auctions, the winning bidder pays the price equal to his bid.94 Conse-
quently, it is unnecessary to analyze the Dutch auction separately in
the ensuing discussion.
In contrast, commentators have observed that the second-price
sealed-bid and English auctions are sometimes strategically
equivalent, 9 but do not always yield the same result.9 6 In both auc-
mineral rights on government-owned land. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 702.
The United States Forest Service uses them to sell timber. See Hansen, Sealed-Bid Versus
Open Auctions: The Evidence, 24 ECON. INQUIRY 123 (1986). The United States Depart-
ment of Interior sells leases of tracts on the outer continental shelf for the exploration and
development of oil and gas through first-price sealed-bid auctions. See Wilson, Auctions
of Shares, 93 Q. J. ECON. 675 (1979). First-price sealed-bid auctions are also used to
procure government and private procurement contracts, as well as to sell art work and
real estate. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 702.
90. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 702. The second-price sealed-bid auc-
tion is also called a Vickrey auction. Id.
91. Id. See also Milgram & Weber, supra note 67, at 1090 n.7. The seller does not
necessarily incur a loss of revenue by requiring the winning bidder to pay the second
highest price, because buyers in this type of auction will often place higher bids than they
would in a first-price auction. Id. While the second-price sealed-bid auction is theoreti-
cally interesting for comparative purposes, it is seldom used in the real world. See Von
Under-Sternberg, Cartel Stability In Sealed-Bid Second-Price Auctions 36 J. INDUST.
ECON. 351 (1988) [hereinafter Von Under-Sternberg]. When sealed-bid auctions are used
in practice, the first-price auction is always chosen above a second-price auction. One
potential reason for this is that not understanding how the second-price auction operates,
sellers believe that they receive a better deal if they take the highest bid instead of the
second highest bid. Id. at 352.
92. See Von Under-Sternberg, supra note 91, at 351.
93. Id.; see also McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 707.
94. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 707.
95. The English and second-price sealed-bid auction are strategically equivalent
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tions a bidder will place a bid up to his own valuation of the object.97
In a second-price sealed-bid auction, however, a bidder cannot change
his bid,9" whereas during an English auction a bidder's valuation of
the item might change as he learns how other bidders value the
item.99 These two auctions, therefore, may yield different results.
C. Auction Behavior
1. Factors That Affect The Behavior of Bidders
When selecting an auction procedure, the seller must weigh four
different factors which affect the behavior of bidders: (1) the risk aver-
sion of the bidders; (2) the value correlation among the different bid-
ders; (3) whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric; and (4)
whether the payment is solely a function of the bid.' °
a. Risk Aversity
In general, bidders are risk averse to losing an auction. Auctions
present bidders with the financial risk of losing the auction and not
obtaining the potential gain from winning the auctioned item.' Ex-
posure to substantial financial risks may transform a risk neutral bid-
der, who is indifferent to the outcome of an auction, into a risk averse
bidder who is concerned with the potential financial ramifications of
the auction's result. 02 If the bidder loses the auction, he not only pays
his bid preparation costs, but also loses the chance to obtain the item,
and any profits it may yield. 0 3 If, however, the bidder wins the auc-
under the independent private value model. See Von Under-Sternberg, supra note 91, at
351. The bidders in both the English and second-price seal-bid auction have dominant
bidding strategies. In the English auction the bidder will not drop out of the bidding until
the current bid is equal to his own valuation of the object. Id. "In the second-price auc-
tion each bidder places a bid equal to his own valuation." Id. In the case of correlated
values, however, a bidder's valuation of an item might change during an English auction
as he obtains additional information about how other bidders value the item.
96. See, e.g., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 722 (when bidders have affiliated
valuations, English auction yields higher expected revenue than second-price sealed-bid
auction).
97. See Von Under-Sternberg, supra note 91, at 351.
98. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 722.
99. Id. Bidders valuations are considered to be affiliated if one bidder's perception of
an item's value affects the other bidder's perception of the item's value. Id. Therefore, if
the bidder's valuations are affiliated, the process of bidding in an English auction conveys
information to the other bidders which affect their valuations of the object and lessens the
effects of the winner's curse. Id. For a discussion of the "winner's curse," see infra notes
117-19 and accompanying text.
100. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 706.
101. Id. at 718.
102. Id. at 706.
103. Id. at 719. In the losing scenario, the bidder may suffer a financial opportunity
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tion, he must pay the winning amount in order to obtain the positive
benefits from the acquired object. '4 The seller can make the bidder's
aversion to the risk of losing the auction dependant on the behavior of
other bidders by designing the auction in such a manner that the
lower losing bidders must pay a fee which is used to subsidize the
higher losing bidders. ' 5 The buyer can decrease the risk of losing the
auction by increasing his bid and accepting a lower profit if he
wins. 106
b. Correlated Values: The Independent-Private- Values Model
Versus The Common- Value Model
In the independent-private-values model each bidder knows exactly
what the true value of the item is worth to him."0 7 The bidder is
unaware and unconcerned about the valuation which competing bid-
ders place on the item.0 8 The valuation of each competing bidder is
drawn from some probability distribution. '0 9 This is similar to the sit-
uation where one has a hat full of tickets printed with randomly se-
lected numbers ranging from one to one hundred. The probability of
someone picking a ticket with a particular number depends on how
many tickets there are in the hat and the number of tickets printed
with that particular number. Both factors have been determined by
chance, and consequently, one person's guess as to what number will
be picked next is statistically independent from another person's
guess."' In a bidding situation the object might have a range of val-
ues. If the number of auction participants whose valuation of the item
0
cost of obtaining a positive benefit. In addition, depending upon the particualr rules of the
auction, a bidder who loses may be forced to pay a fee to either the seller or to other
losing bidders who placed higher bids. Id.
104. Id. In the winning scenario, the bidder takes the financial risk that the fees paid
will exceed the actual positive benefits acquired from the object.
105. Id. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
106. Id. "By marginally increasing his bid, [the bidder] lowers his profit if he wins but
increases the probability of this event." Id.
107. Id. at 705.
108. Id. Under the independent-private-values model, learning about another's valua-
tion of the object will not cause the bidder to change his own evaluation, Id.
109. Id. "The probability distribution of a discrete random variable [X] provides ihe
probability of each possible value of the random variable. If P(x) is the probability that x
is the value of the random variable, the sum of P(x) for all values of X must be one." E.
MANSFIELD, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 146 (2d ed. 1983). This is be-
cause these values of X are mutually exclusive and one of them must occur. Id. at 114. A
discrete random variable is based on a set of finite numerical values and is determined by
chance. Id. at 146.
110. Each bidder assumes that the valuation of any other bidder is drawn from some
probability distribution which provides the probability of each possible value of the ran-
dom variable. See E. Mansfield, supra note 109, at 146.
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falls within that range is determined by chance, then every bidder's
valuation is statistically independent.'
An example of this model would be an art auction in which the
bidders are consumers purchasing for their own collection rather than
as an investment. Under this scenario, a person's appraisal of a piece
of art depends on personal preference. Each bidder knows exactly
how much he enjoys and values a particular piece of art. The bidder is
unsure of and unconcerned with the value which competing bidders
place on the artwork. Since each bidder's personal tastes and thus
their valuation of the art is made independently of any other bidder,
information about another individual's valuation will not change the
bidder's personal valuation." 12
In the common-value model, the item being auctioned is objectively
valued by its worth in the market place. " 3 However, neither the bid-
ders nor the seller knows the item's true market value. "14 By obtaining
information about the object, bidders are able to guess at the item's
objective worth. "15 Thus, in an art auction where the bidders are deal-
ers who plan to resell the art, if bidder A learns of bidder B's valua-
tion of the item, A is provided with some useful information
regarding the item's true market value. Bidder A may alter his esti-
mation of the item when he learns this additional information. Thus,
A's valuation of the object will be correlated to B's valuation of the
item.' 16
Winning bidders in a common-value model auction may suffer from
a phenomenon known as the "winner's curse. '""I7 The winner's curse
can occur in the first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions when there
are two or more bidders and the price of the object is equal to the
111. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 705.
112. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
113. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 705. For example, if the item being
auctioned is a set of oil rights to a particular tract of land, the amount of oil actually lying
beneath the ground is the item's single objective value. Id.
114. Id. Bidders having access to different information may make different guesses
about the item's objective worth. Id.
115. Id. Under the common-value model, learning of another bidder's valuation of the
object provides additional useful information about the item's likely true value.
116. The positive correlation of the bidders' valuations of an item is known as affilia-
tion. Id. at 706.
117. Id. at 720; see also Meyer, Competition and Bidding Behavior: Some Evidence
From The Rice Market, 26 EcON. INQUIRY 123 (1988) [hereinafter Meyer]. The "win-
ner's curse" is the situation in which the winner pays more than the market value for the
item. Id. The risk of suffering the winner's curse could be transferred to the seller if the
seller would guarantee that the market value will not differ from the winning bidder's
estimated value by a given amount. Moreover, such a guarantee would provide bidders
with an incentive to bid more aggressively. Id. at 124.
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highest bid.' 18 In these types of auctions the winner often pays more
than the true market value of the item. This is especially true when
the winner realizes that his bid was much greater than the unbiased
estimate of all the other bidders. Thus, the highest bidder falls prey to
the "winner's curse."'119
The independent-private-values and the common-value models
both represent extreme situations. In practice, auctions contain as-
pects of both models.1 21 In the art auction example, a collector's valu-
ation of a piece of art may be based upon a combination of his
personal taste for the artwork and its investment and market value.
12 1
As a result, bidders' valuations for an item will differ depending upon
how closely their bidding is aligned with one of the models.' 22
c. Bidder Recognition
Bidder recognition concerns the question of whether the bidders are
in some way recognizably different from each other.123 If the bidders
draw their valuation from the same set of discrete random variables
and hence the same probability distribution, they are considered to be
symmetric bidders. Asymmetric bidders derive their bids from a dif-
ferent set of discrete random variables and different probability distri-
butions.' 24 For example, an asymmetric bidding situation may arise
when both foreign and domestic firms submit bids for a government
procurement contract. Because of comparative advantages, there are
systematic cost differences between the foreign and domestic firms. 125
Consequently, each type of firm will draw from a different discrete set
of random variables and will submit bids that reflect their cost con-
straints; therefore, the firms are asymmetric bidders.
d. Payment Certainty
The seller may also be subject to uncertainty if the amount of pay-
118. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 720.
119. Id.; see also Meyer, supra note 117, at 123. In first-price auctions, bidders face a
great risk of overestimating the value of an object whose market value is uncertain. Such
overestimation often occurs when the bidder places a bid based on the expected value of
the object that is derived solely from his private information. Id.
120. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 705.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 706.
124. Id.
125. Id. For example, if a foreign firm has lower labor costs or different tax structures,
it may be able to produce the item at a lower cost to the consumer, and yet earn the same
amount of profit as a domestic firm.
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ment is contingent only upon bids. 2 6 In some circumstances the
item's true value may be correlated with other variables which are
unknown to both the bidder and the seller at the time of the auction.
However, these variables may be mutually observable after the auc-
tion. In such circumstances, it is to the seller's advantage to make the
winning bidder's payment dependent upon a combination of the other
variables and the bid. For example, in an auction for the right to pub-
lish a book, royalties render the winning bidder's payment dependent
on the number of books that are sold as well as the winning bid. 2 7
2. The Benchmark Auction Model
The classic benchmark model is used to compare the different types
of auctions 128 under various circumstances that affect bidder behav-
ior.' 29 The classic benchmark auction is defined by the following four
assumptions: (1) the bidders are risk neutral; (2) the independent-pri-
vate-value model applies; (3) the bidders are symmetric; and (4) pay-
ment is solely a function of the bid.'3 ° Each assumption is applied
separately to demonstrate its individual effect on each of the four auc-
tion types. A mathematical comparison of the results of a benchmark
auction demonstrates that, on average, each of the four auction forms
yields the same price for the seller. Thus, in a benchmark auction the
type of auction used is irrelevant.' 3 ' However, as the assumptions in
the benchmark model underlying risk aversion and correlated value
factors are relaxed, the advantages of the different auction types
emerge. 1
32
IV. A Proposal For Designing An Optimal Auction
For Corporate Control
After a target's board of directors has decided to conduct an auc-
tion for the company, the directors should determine how to design
and execute a fair auction to meet their fiduciary obligations under
Revlon 131 and Macmillan and to maximize shareholder's profits.
34
126. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 706.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
129. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 710.
130. Id. at 706.
131. Id. at 707.
132. Id. at 714.
133. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). See supra
notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
134. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,401, at 92,583 (Del. May 3, 1989). See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying
text.
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An optimal auction from a seller's perspective is one which extracts
all surplus from the bidders.' In order to find the optimal method of
conducting an auction for corporate control, the target's board of di-
rectors must determine the proper assumptions for each of the four
factors identified above, given the particular attributes of the corpora-
tion. The board must focus on the two most prevalent factors-risk
aversion and correlative values-since these factors vary from bidder
to bidder and play an important role in each bidder's valuation of the
company. In an auction for corporate control, the benchmark as-
sumptions that bidder recognition is symmetric,1 36 and that payment
is contingent only on the bids,' 37 are usually correct. These assump-
tions are true because generally, the cost of raising capital does not
significantly differ among bidders. In addition, unlike a royalty, the
price obtained for a company is not based on a percentage of the tar-
get's earnings after the sale.
Although sellers cannot be sure of obtaining the highest possible
price for an item in an auction, 3 8 the seller can use certain instru-
ments to encourage bidders to submit honest valuations, thereby in-
creasing the possibility of the seller maximizing his revenue and
achieving the optimal auction price. For example, increasing the
number of bidders in an auction increases the probability of a particu-
lar bidder having the highest valuation, thereby usually raising the
seller's revenue.' 39 Thus, if a seller can convince more bidders to join
the auction process by disseminating information about the item to all
potential bidders, the seller may be able to increase his revenue."
A. The Optimal Auction For Risk Averse Bidders
When the value of the item being sold is so great that the bids are
relatively large compared to the bidders' assets, the bidders are likely
135. See Maskin & Riley, Auction Theory With Private Values, 75 AM. EcON. REV.
150 (1985) [hereinafter Maskin & Riley I] (providing a mathematical proof for an opti-
mal auction).
136. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
138. An auction is supposed to have a Parieto efficient outcome where the item being
auctioned is awarded to the bidder with the highest value. See McAfee & McMillan,
supra note 4, at 711.
139. Id.; see also Meyer, supra note 117, at 123 (as the market becomes more competi-
tive, the bidder will raise his bid).
140. See French & McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competi-
tion, 57 J. OF Bus. 417 (1984) [hereinafter French & McCormick]. From a bidder's per-
spective, as the number of bidders increases, each bidder's expected profit decreases
because the winning bidder's expected profit falls, along with the probability that any
particular bidder will win and obtain his expected profit. Id. at 423.
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to be extremely averse to losing the auction.14' If the bidder loses the
auction he obtains nothing and loses the opportunity to obtain poten-
tial profits. 142
When dealing with a risk-averse bidder, the first-price sealed-bid
auction generally produces greater revenue than the English or sec-
ond-price sealed-bid auctions.'43 In a first-price sealed-bid auction
each bidder knows that he has one opportunity to submit a bid to win
the auction and that he must do so without knowing the other bid-
ders' valuations.' As the bidder's risk aversion increases, his fear of
losing the auction heightens. 4 By increasing his bid, the bidder de-
creases his potential profit, but increases his probability of winning.
Thus, the bidder closes the gap between his bid and his honest
valuation. 46
In an English auction the bidder is aware of the other bidders' bids
for the item. Therefore, the highest bidder will not bid close to his
honest valuation of the item, but only just above the bid of the second
highest bidder.'47 In the second-price sealed-bid auction the highest
bidder will bid up to or slightly above his honest valuation of the item;
the seller, however, receives only a payment equivalent to the second
highest bid. 4
Although on average, the first-price sealed-bid auction will produce
greater revenue than other auction types, 4 9 the seller can use several
instruments in combination with the first-price sealed-bid auction to
maximize his expected income from risk averse bidders. 50 The seller
could increase his expected revenue by extracting a fee from low bid-
ders which would be divided and paid back only to the high bidders
141. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 718.
142. See id. at 719.
143. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 719. See also, Maskin & Riley I, supra
note 135, at 152; see also Maskin and Riley, OptimalAuctions with Risk Averse Buyers, 52
ECONOMETRICA 1473, 1475 (1984) [hereinafter Maskin & Riley II] (containing a mathe-
matical theorem which demonstrates that the first-price sealed-bid auction generates a
greater expected revenue for the seller than the English auction).
144. See McAfee & McMillian, supra note 4, at 719.
145. See Maskin & Riley I, supra note 135, at 152.
146. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 719.
147. See supra notes 95-99; see also Maskin & Riley I, supra note 135, at 151. The
behavior of a risk-averse bidder is not altered in an English auction. In an English auction
the optimal strategy for the bidder is to drop out when he reaches his exact reservation
price. Id.
148. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
149. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 719; see also Maskin & Riley II, supra
note 143, at 1473. (providing a comprehensive mathematical analysis of optimal auctions
which are designed to maximize the seller's expected revenue when he faces risk averse
bidders with unknown preferences).
150. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 719-20.
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who lose. Thus, the highest bidderi wins the object, the other high
bidders lose the object but win the fee collected from the low bidders,
and the low bidders pay a fee for submitting lower bids. The seller
therefore increases his expected revenue because he greatly increases
the risk of submitting low bids.' 5 ' Under this scenario, all bidders
will be encouraged to bid higher in order to avoid the potential pen-
alty incurred by the lowest bidders. 52
Another instrument at the seller's disposal is the bidder's knowl-
edge of how many competitors are in the auction.153 In a "first-price
sealed-bid auction the expected selling price is strictly higher when
the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when
they know this [information]."' 54 Generally, a bidder has a miscon-
ception about the number of auction participants. A bidder believes
that more bidders participate in the auction than actually enter. As a
result, the bidder will bid closer to his true valuation of the object for
fear of being out bid by numerous other bidders. The ultimate result is
that the auction is more competitive and profitable for the seller if he
does not reveal the number of bidders who will participate. 55
B. The Optimal Auction For Bidders With Correlated Values
An auction for a company simultaneously contains aspects of the
independent-private-value model and the common-value model.' 15 6
The weight that each model is given in an auction for corporate con-
trol depends upon the bidders' plans for the company's assets. The
following three examples illustrate the interaction between the bid-
ders' planned use of the company and the weight given to a model.
In the first example, the company that is being auctioned is a bot-
tling company and most of the bidders are other bottling companies
that plan to use the auctioned company for its synergic value (e.g., an
increase in economies of scale). 57 Most bidders will know exactly
151. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 719; see also Maskin & Riley II, supra
note 143, at 1474.
152. See MacAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 719-20; see also Maskin & Riley I,
supra note 135, at 151. This is because a risk averse bidder's fear of losing increases with
the introduction of a penalty, causing an increase in the expected revenue from the high
valuation bidder. Id. If the risk aversion is not very strong, the optimal auction can be
mimicked by having the seller charge a bidding fee that is a decreasing function of the
bid. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 720.
153. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 720.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text.
157. Synergy is defined as "potential reductions in production and distribution costs
through various devices available to the combined firm but not to the two firms operated
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how they value the, company. Under this scenario, the independent-
private-value model is more heavily weighted. 158
In the second example, the company being offered for sale is a to-
bacco company that has two food producing subsidiaries. Most of the
bidders are tobacco companies that plan to use the tobacco division of
the auctioned company for its synergic value while selling off the food
producing subsidiaries. In this situation the models are more equally
weighted. Although the bidders can accurately value the tobacco divi-
sion, they are uncertain as to the true market resale value of the food
subsidiaries. 159
In the third example, the company being auctioned is a conglomer-
ate with most of the bidders consisting of leveraged buyout firms
which plan to dispose of the company's assets. The leveraged buyout
firms will attempt to estimate the true market value of the corpora-
tion's assets.' 6 This will cause the common market value to be more
heavily weighted. 161
The bidders' reactions to the four common types of auctions 162 will
depend upon which correlation model they follow. In the sale of a
corporation, where the majority of the bidders do not intend to resell
the entire corporation (e.g., it is not a true common-value scenario),163
the bidder will base his bid on a combination of his own intrinsic
value of the corporation, and an estimate of the corporation's true
market value. 164
In general, risk neutral bidders using the independent-private-value
model will have equal average returns regardless of the type of auc-
tion, because each bidder's valuation of the object is unaffected by
that of the other bidders. 165 On the average, therefore, risk averse bid-
ders using this model will obtain a greater return using the first-price
sealed-bid auction. 16
6
separately." R. Roll, Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS 241, 245 (1988).
158. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
162. The four types of auctions are the Dutch, English, first-price sealed-bid, and sec-
ond-price sealed-bid. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
163. The intent to resell all of the assets of the target corporation is a true common
value scenario. See generally, McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 705 (auction of an
antique to bidders who are dealers which intend to resell the item is a common value
scenario).
164. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
165. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 722. See also Maskin & Riley I, supra
note 135, at 153-54 for an illustration of the mathematical proof.
166. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
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In a common-value auction with risk neutral bidders having affili-
ated values, 167 the English auction yields the highest expected revenue
followed by the second-price sealed-bid auction and the first-price
sealed-bid Dutch auction.168 The English auction process conveys in-
formation to the bidders' 69 by allowing them to observe the price at
which other bidders drop out of the auction. 170 This has the effect of
making each bidder's private information about the item's true value
partially public, thus reducing the effect of the winner's curse when
bidders' valuations are affiliated. 171
In the case of a corporation, the bidders will be risk averse and their
behavior will fall somewhere in between the two polarized correlation
models. Under this scenario, the risk aversion of the bidders must be
weighed against the strength of the bidders' correlated values in order
to determine whether the English or first-price sealed-bid auction type
is preferable. The limited number of empirical studies of auctions in-
volving risk averse buyers with partially affiliated valuations seems to
indicate that the first-price sealed-bid auction may on average yield a
slightly higher return.' 72 This evidence, however, is not conclusive.'73
As with risk averse bidders, a seller can use several instruments to
maximize his expected revenue.' 74 In a common-value auction, the
bidders' valuation of the item's actual market value is correlated to
any independent information about the item's true value.' 75 "Thus,
the seller can increase his expected revenue by having a policy of pub-
licizing any information that he has about the item's true value."' 176
Another advantage of the seller publicizing information is that the
cost of preparing a bid is lowered. Lower bid preparation costs may
167. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
168. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 722. See Maskin & Riley I, supra note
135, at 153-54 for an illustration of the mathematical proof.
169. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 722.
170. Id. The bidders are not concerned with lost opportunity cost because each as-
sumption of the benchmark auction model is applied separately. See supra notes 128-32
and accompanying text.
171. Id. For a discussion of the winner's curse, see supra notes 117-19 and accompany-
ing text.
172. The United States Forest Service has used both the first-price sealed-bid auction
and the English auction to sell contracts for harvesting timber. These types of contracts
attract risk averse bidders who intend to resell the timber and therefore have correlated
values. This evidence has demonstrated that sealed-bid auctions yield about 10% more
revenue than English auctions. See Hansen, supra note 89, at 136.
173. Although the magnitude of these results has been questioned, at a minimum, the
sealed bid auction yields a slightly higher price than the English auction. Id.
174. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 722.
175. Id.
176. See Meyer, supra note 117, at 124. A seller can also increase his revenue by pro-
viding the bidders with more accurate information. Id.
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entice additional bidders to enter the auction, thereby creating a more
competitive auction and increasing the seller's expected return.' 77 Set-
ting a public reserve price-the minimum that the seller is willing to
accept for the object-is one method that can be used to give the bid-
ders information about the object's true value and increase the seller's
revenue from an English auction.' 8 By setting a reserve price the
seller is able to eliminate the risk of being faced with the dilemma of
accepting a bid below expected revenue, or breaking the commitment
to the bidders and withdrawing the offer to sell.' 79
Auction theory can be used by directors to design and execute a
fair auction in order to maximize shareholder profits, thereby fulfil-
ling their fiduciary obligations under Revlon 180 and Macmillan.'
s
'
Futhermore, auction theory will aid courts in scrutinizing the
"fairness" of the auction's design and execution as required by
Macmillan.'82
V. Conclusion
The Macmillan court held that a board of directors can design and
conduct any type of auction as long as they observe the requirement
of fairness for the purpose of obtaining the highest price for the share-
holders. A general understanding of auction theory will aid courts in
scrutinizing the actions of directors under the altered Revlon version
of the two prong Unocal test. In addition, auction theory will aid di-
rectors in understanding how to design and execute Revlon auctions
and how to best respond to differing bids in order to maximize share-
holder profit.
Steven B. Katz
177. See French & McCormick, supra note 140, at 434. For example, a store owner
(seller) can induce a buyer (bidder) to enter his store through advertising, thus lowering
the buyer's search cost for the product. Id.
178. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 4, at 729.
179. Id.
180. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). See supra
notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
181. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,401, at 92,583 (Del. May 3, 1989). See supra notes 45-62 and accompanying
text.
182. Id.
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